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Out of the path : in quest of a medium-run growth model
Introduction
Growth economics and the debates surrounding its development spread throughout the in-
ternational communities of economists with a 1939 contribution made by Roy. F. Harrod and
his Essay on Dynamic Theory. The number of scientiﬁc publications concerning the issue rose
signiﬁcantly from 1956-1957 with the publication of Solow's famous articles A Contribution to
the Theory of Economic Growth (1956) and Technical Change and the Aggregate Production
Function (1957) (see table 1 below, from Boianovsky and Hoover, 2009).
Several communities of researchers took interest in the matter : amongst others, we had
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the Universities of Harvard, Stanford  in
the United States  and Cambridge, Oxford, the London School of Economics  in the United
Kingdom. There was also the Australian economists community : the same year as Solow, Trevor
Swan published Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation, a paper in which the model he
presented would be assimilated to Solow's.
In this paper, I shall focus on the communities of the MIT and Cambridge and the in-
teractions they had during the 1956-1968 period concerning the growth issues. I will try to
deﬁne those relationships, the nature of the questions they addressed  focusing on growth 
and see how each community of understanding (Stanley Fish, 1980) dealt with those issues.
When he released his contribution, Robert Solow had been part of MIT since 1949. Based in
Cambridge (USA), the Economics Department really took oﬀ with the arrival of Paul Samuelson
in 1940. In the 1950's, Robert Solow and Paul Samuelson turned the department into a commu-
nity of researchers, by developing speciﬁc graduate and undergraduate courses. (Cherrier,2011)
Thanks to their educational vision, they spread a new way of doing economics, recruiting the
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best students who would become the best theorists, and that in old and new areas of economics
such as growth economics.
On the old continent, economists from Cambridge, UK, were also important contributors to
the growth debates. Joan Robinson, Nicolas Kaldor, Luigi Pasinetti took interest in the matter,
proposing their own models in opposition of the American neo-classical view. Young Amartya
Sen at Cambridge since 1953 and young Frank Hahn  he joined Cambridge university as a
lecturer in 1960 - had more in-between positions.
The two Cambridges debated a lot around many economic questions. The Controversies
that characterised their relationship are often presented regarding the question of the nature of
the capital but they were about another area of economics : growth. Beyond the simple oppo-
sition of two types of models (neo-Keynesian vs. neo-Classical), the problems identiﬁed in the
growth models developed in the second part of the 1950's run deep in the roots of the economic
growth theory. Solow (1956) et Kaldor (1957) both claimed that they were trying to solve the
inherent instability of the Harrod-Domar model. By doing so, they developed long run models
of growth, very stable but without an independent investment function  savings being at all
times equal to full-employment investment. The models presented are always equilibrium mo-
dels, making the connection with the short run  and Keynesian  model complicated, if not
impossible. In a 1960 article, Frank Hahn emphasised the fact that [...] no analysis of the
behavior of the system when out of equilibrium has been proposed, and he tried in his article to
study the stability of full-employment growth equilibrium. In 1964, Hahn and Matthews, in their
survey of economic growth theory (then by Sen, 1970), pointed out the absence of entrepreneurs
expectations in Solow's 1956 model. This absence revealed a limit in growth analysis towards
Harrod's original work : Harrod linked instability to failed entrepreneurs expectations, giving an
endogenous origin to economic cycles.
Does that mean that any short term related issues were systematically dismissed from growth
economics ? Absolutely not. Since the mid-1950's Solow himself showed that he was concerned
by the uniﬁcation of long term  Classical  framework and short-run  Keynesian  framework
which would reappear in his later work on what he would call medium-run equilibrium (Assous,
2013). But the question is overshadowed by more than one diﬃculties, the ﬁrst would be of what
was the true purpose of Harrod and Domar's contributions and the way they were interpreted
in the 1950's by both communities. It is important to remember at this stage of our argument
that the models provided by Harrod were often considered a bit confusing.
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Even if it can be stated that those economists simply misread and misunderstood Harrod by
trying to build a long-run model of economic growth (Halsmayer and Hoover, 2013), I will sup-
port the fact that each economists read Harrod's work from their community of understanding
perspective. They interpreted Harrod with the intellectual tools and environment they had access
to, challenged by their own members or outsiders concerning the out-of-equilibrium models. The
members of MIT and Cambridge interacted with each other, criticising, inﬂuencing each other's
work. From those interactions resulted major questions on the growth models. Expectations,
distribution, investment : they all became at one point or the other limits to the development of
those models. Those major issues lead some economists  Hahn, Sen, Stiglitz, Solow himself  to
try make a synthesis. As I will maintain, in the last part of this paper, that quest for a synthesis
was in fact part of a process to make the possibility of a medium run growth equilibrium emerge.
Cambridge-Cambridge : NOT on the Capital controversies
The Cambridge capital controversy is probably one of the most renowned episode in modern
history of the economic thought. Economists from both sides of the Atlantic struggled about
concepts that constituted the core of economic theory, such as the capital aggregation problem
and the reswitching problem for almost 20 years. Beyond the controversy on the nature of capital
launched by Joan Robinson in 1953, the debates heavily inﬂuenced the ﬁeld of growth economics.
In this ﬁrst part, I will present each community and their main contributors in growth theory.
Once the characters are introduced, I will expose their mutual growth models. Then, through
the concept of interpretative community (Fish, 1980), I will attempt to compare the process
that led each community to develop such diﬀerent models, process that was, as a matter of fact,
heavily nourished by regular interactions between the two groups of economists.
1 Economics at MIT : building an intellectual community (1956-
1968)
1.1 A (would be brief) history of the Economics Department
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology is over 150 years old. Its Economics Department
is relatively young in comparison : it is only in the 1930's that a department of social sciences
was created (Cherrier, 2011). But in a matter of decades, this department became the place
that would form the elite of the economic academic circles. In the 1950's and until the mid-
1960's, it recruited the best students and it was at the center of strategical economic decisions
through the participation of its people in the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA). The number
of Nobel Prizes awarded to MIT people is quite impressive and so are the notable Alumni of the
department that occupied key positions in American and international administrations.
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Yet, the literature that would describe us the MIT microcosm does not seem available.
Few are the historians that tried to describe the way things worked in the MIT. Only Mirowsky
(2006), Mehrling (2005, 192-5) and Cherrier (2011) seem to have touched the subject of the
dynamic that made such a community of economists work. This lack of description can be the
result of the several areas in which the Economics Department of MIT excelled and intervened,
making diﬃcult to put all its members under a unique designation.
Nevertheless, there is deﬁnitely a MIT-style that can be traced back to the arrival of Paul
Samuelson in 1940. It really took oﬀ when Samuelson was joined by Robert Solow at the end of
the 1940's. They both shaped the department according to their vision of a new way of doing
economics. New tools, new applications, new curriculum : economics at MIT were diﬀerent. It
is a whole community project, with its own internal logic, that can be seen here.
Through their educational project, Solow and Samuelson were building a group of economists
that would be self-aware of their own distinctiveness.
Forming Elite Teachers
Solow, more than Samuelson, was especially involved in the education provided at MIT.
He was one of the main architects of the professionalization of the economists. The excellence of
the curriculum, the teachers and the students enabled the diploma delivered by the MIT to be
a sign of credibility (Fourcade, 2009). The MIT economists would be recruited throughout the
academic, institutional and corporate sectors. In the 1950's, the Economics department counted
also Charles Kindleberg and Evsey Domar (1958) as main ﬁgures. Domar would teach compara-
tive economic system and soviet economics, Kindleberg would develop ﬁnance. What made MIT
so special regarding economics ? Probably, the unusual student oriented teaching department :
We view ourselves as net exporters of ﬁnished economists, [...]
Solow to Domar (1956).
In 1948, Samuelson published Economics : An Introductory Analysis. This textbook had
a huge success and spread throughout universities. Undergraduate students were moulded by
Samuelson's vision of economics and he himself became notorious. Samuelson carefully updated
the next editions of his textbook so that it would remain a must-read to economic students
(Skousen, 1997). Undergraduate courses took place based on that textbook : it was actually quite
rare for faculties to provide undergraduate courses in economics. But the main goal was to
form elite teachers in the graduate school of the Economics Department. Each year, around 20
students were recruited. Peter Diamond was one of those students, he completed his PhD in 1961
and would become one of the most important growth theorists of his generation. He had started
his years at MIT in the mathematics department before switching to economics (Moscarini and
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Wright, 2007). Robert Solow and Charles Kindleberg supervised many students during their
PhD dissertations such as Peter Diamond, Alain Enthoven or Robert Mundell. Teaching was
at the center of the system put together by Solow and Samuelson to produce high quality eco-
nomic researchers, that who would themselves train new elite economists. The system seemed
to work and the MIT started to lure cutting edge economists from other universities that would
continue to develop the graduate and undergraduate curriculum between 1955 and 1965. Robert
Solow, Paul Samuelson with the help of Evsey Domar and Charles Kindleberd had managed to
build a strong and solid community. Karl Shell joined MIT in 1964 and recalls the atmosphere
of the Economics Department (Spear and Wright, 2001) :
The atmosphere was intense. The MIT economics faculty had lunch at a big table, at which
Paul [Samuelson] held court. I was dazzled by Paulas I expected to bebut I was also im-
pressed by the breadth of general competence in the MIT department. Bob [Solow] was on leave
during my ﬁrst year. When we ﬁnally met, I was equally dazzled by Boba very deep guy, who
tries to make us believe that it all came easily. Bob was splendid at getting the most out of
others, always making MIT a happy place. I learned so much from Bob, Paul, Franco [Modi-
gliani], andof coursemy suitemate, coauthor, and friend, Frank Fisher.
Teaching appears like a central element in the dynamic of the MIT of the 1955-1965 period.
Could that explain the emulation that took place at the Economic Department at that time ? It
could be interesting to ﬁnd out.
Shell was not the only economist to become aﬃliate with MIT, there were also : Franklin Fisher,
Franco Modigliani, Robert Eckaus, Edwin Kuh, Albert Ando, Stephen Marglin, Joseph Stiglitz,
among others.
Being part of the public debates
Another feature that is notable about MIT is the way its members were prominent parti-
cipants of the public debates. Through their work for the RAND corporation and the several
American administrations, MIT-economists spread their ways of thinking and making econo-
mics at the political and national level. Many of the MIT-Alumni occupied key positions in
the American administrations : Department of the Treasury, Committee for economic develop-
ment, Attorney General's committee, Bureau of the Budget. MIT's inﬂuence and involvement
with policy matters became more apparent in 1960, during the presidential election. Samuelson
openly supported John F. Kennedy, becoming one of his campaign advisors. In 1960, Samuelson
and Solow's estimation of the Phillips Curve allowed them to establish a stable and exploitable
structural relationship between unemployment and inﬂation. This became an argument in favour
of the use of inﬂation against unemployment during the 1960's campaign against Richard Nixon.
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In 1961, Robert Solow became part of the Counsel of Economic Advisors where he worked with
James Tobin, Walter Heller and Kermit Gordon. Samuelson and Solow, and all economists sur-
rounding them, promoted a new way to apprehend the job of economists : they were experts,
who could help to guide the American economic decisions, thanks to their insight of the economic
science. The research resulting from the study of those public issues would also come to nourish
the curriculum of the MIT-students, making them ready to deal with real life public issues. The
MIT style
As I already emphasised at the beginning, the MIT Economics Department is not easily
deﬁned as a unique entity. As a matter of fact, it is complicated to talk about a school of
thought because the area of theories addressed by its economists are very wide. It might be
deﬁned through the tools developed to make economics a theoretical discipline as much as an
applied one. Paul Krugman (1995) recalls the MIT style : small models applied to real problems,
blending real-world observation and a little mathematics to cut through to the core of an issue.
But the MIT-style might also be deﬁned through the community that takes shape when
you try to take a closer look at MIT history. In 1995, Krugman, recalling his years in MIT :
Finally, at MIT I got my ﬁrst sense of the wider role an economist can play in the world. Solow
and Samuelson shaped a community that interconnected researchers, teaching and policy worlds
in intricate ways.
That special style met real success in the early 1960's and the MIT managed to get top students
to enrol in its economics program. In his article about Robert Solow in the New Palgrave Dic-
tionary of Economics, Alan S. Blinder (2008) underlines the fact that he [Solow] was also the
dissertation adviser of choice for scores of MIT's most promising graduate students over a per-
iod of time spanning 45 years. The list of Solow dissertation students, particularly in the 1960s,
reads like an all-star team. In the two years 1966 and 1967 alone (based on completion dates),
he supervised the Ph.D. dissertations of (in alphabetical order) George Akerlof, Robert Gordon,
Robert Hall, William Nordhaus, Eytan Sheshinski, Joseph Stiglitz, and Martin Weitzman.
Another point can be addressed concerning this MIT-style : MITItrained theorists as well as
applied economists. Robert Solow himself was one of those applied economists and it is clear that
his theoretical work was highly inﬂuenced by his work relationship with other applied economists
 such as Edwin Kuh. The quest for empirical accuracy is what made the art of economics go
forward.
One area of economic theory that appears to have been most inﬂuenced by this MIT-style
is probably growth theory.
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1.2 Growth at MIT
Growth : a patriotic stake
Post-second world war period was one period of opposition between capitalism and com-
munism. Western countries had to deal with communist USSR, more powerful than ever, whose
economics seemed to grow faster than ever. As a matter of fact, growth was a central policy
matter in the United States of the 1950's and the 1960's. The American Minister of Defence ap-
pealed to economists to produce studies under military contracts. Those studies would feed the
economic research program of MIT. Growth economics was already an important area of research
 in fact since Domar's 1939 contribution. The MIT managed to distinguish itself from other
institutions on that subject thanks to that special "MIT-style". With their speciﬁc tools and
pragmatic way of dealing with economic growth issues, MIT-economists appeared to be the most
qualiﬁed to tackle that patriotic stake. Hence, early sixties became the "golden age of growth
theory" (Stiglitz, 2001, Boianovky and Hoover, 2013). Peter Diamond's and David Levhari's
PhD dissertations (resp. 1963 and 1964) both had growth  in link with public debt - at the cen-
ter of their subject. The conjunction of all those reasons  historic, methodological, political
 might explain the success of the 1956 Solow model. Its elegance, the relatively "simple" way 
in the MIT-style  it seemed to answer the instability problem of the Harrod-Domar model allo-
wed a speciﬁc framework, in which other growth models would be developed, to become popular.
Solow's 1956 growth model : origins
Robert Solow was 16 when he joined Harvard College in 1940. He joined the U.S. Army
until he was demobilised in 1945. He then went back to Harvard and started to work under Was-
sili Leontief's guidance as a research assistant. Solow produced the ﬁrst set of capital-coeﬃcients
for Leontief's input-output model. A connection can be made between his work on Leontief's
model and the interest he took on Harrod's work. In his article A Note on the Price Level and
Interest Rate in a Growth Model (1953-54), Solow himself identiﬁes Harrod's dynamic model to
the Leontief's input-output model. In a footnote of this article, he also connects Domar's model
to Leontief's (see Marcel Boumans, 2009) :
The same kind of theoretical system was formulated quite explicitly by Evsey Domar in Ca-
pital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment, Econometrica, April, 1946, p. 137, and
subsequent papers, where the treatment is even more clear-cut than Harrod's. I refer to Harrod
instead only because I here follow Harrod in the use of discrete time periods.
1956 Solow's paper is an attempt to solve the inherent instability problems of the Harrod-
Domar model. Even if Solow points out, in the introduction of the article, the fact that A
remarkable characteristic of the Harrod-Domar model is that it consistently studies long-run
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problems with the usual short-run tools, he cannot accept so much instability for a simple rea-
son : the Western economies don't show such signs of instability, therefore this model cannot
describe reality and another one must be invented. Solow sees the instability of the Har-
rod model as the result of a dubious assumption : production takes place under ﬁxed factor
proportions. That leads to the fundamental opposition between the warranted rate of growth
(determined as the ratio of the savings rate and the capital-output ratio) and the natural rate
of growth (determined by the rates of technical progress and population growth) which allows
the economy to be at best balanced on a knife-edge of equilibrium growth. As Solow explains
to us : Were the magnitudes of the key parameters  the savings ratio, the capital-output ratio,
the rate of increase of the labor force  to slip ever so slightly from dead center, the consequence
would be either growing unemployment or prolonged inﬂation. His solution is then to abandon
the assumption of ﬁxed factor proportions, the instability problems disappearing with it. The
model he presents seems to work : it runs smoothly and the warranted rate of growth equals the
natural rate of growth in the long run.
Solow's 1956 growth model : a quick presentation
The world famous model is the perfect example of the MIT-style way of doing economics.
Solow uses a relatively simple dynamic model to study the general conditions of growth. The
roots of the use of those mathematical models can be traced back to Samuelson's contributions
from the second part of the 1930's and his work for the RAND corporation in 1949. As this
model  that we shall call 'neo-classical' from now on - is largely known, I will present its main
features, so that I will be able to discuss its consequences in comparison with 'post-keynesian'
models produced in Cambridge (UK).
Solow's model is based on a production function, with substitutability of factors, written as
follows :
Y = F (K,L) (1)
with K : capital and L : work
The marginal productivities of each production factor are positive and decreasing. Inada's
assumptions (à préciser en pied de page) are respected. Through a deﬁnition of savings S that al-
ways equals investment I  putting aside a central Keynesian assumption about eﬀective demand
 Solow manages to derive the fundamental dynamic equation of growth :
S = sY = sF (K,L) = K˙ =
∂K
∂t
= I (2)
Here capital depletion is not taking into account.
y = f(k) (3)
with y = YL and k =
K
L
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K˙L
= sf(k) (4)
k˙
k
=
K˙
K
− L˙
L
=
K˙
K
˘n (5)
with n : growth rate of L
k˙ = sf(k)− nk (6)
Here is our dynamic equation of growth. Capital per capita variation k˙ depends on the level of
n relatively to the level of f(k). The condition of equilibrium is :
k˙ = sf(k∗)˘nk∗ = 0 (7)
So we have : k* such as sf(k∗) = nk → sf(k∗)/k∗ = n.
Dynamics and distribution
Solow's model shows an incredible stability of the growth path described.
If k < k∗, there is sf(k)/k > n : K increases faster than L
In this case, the system is such that K˙K =
I
K = g > n.
K becomes more abundant than L : its price decreases relatively to L price. Producers then
prefer K to L : the ratio k increases until it reaches k∗
If k > k∗, the results are symmetrically the same : the ration k decreases until it reaches k∗.
The system equilibrium is such that k˙ = 0 so we have :
k˙
k
=
K˙
K
− L˙
L
=
K˙
K
− n = 0
→ K˙
K
=
L˙
L
= n
And :
y˙
y
=
k˙
k
= 0
→ y˙
y
=
Y˙
Y
− L˙
L
⇒ y˙
y
=
Y˙
Y
=
L˙
L
= n
The Cobb-Douglas function is the typical production function that meets the conditions
imposed by the model :
Y = KαL1−α
From the calculation of the marginal products of capital r and of work w, we ﬁnd the following
distribution of revenue : α = rKY =
P
Y and 1 − α = wLY = WP where P : sum of proﬁts and W :
sum of wages.
Distribution is ﬁxed through time, pre-determined by the model. Indeed, P/Y and W/P are
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constant and L and K increase at the same rate n. Solow has resolved the Harrod-Domar insta-
bility problem, so it appears. This presentation is obviously a very brief one and I shall discuss
further the link of the model with the Harrod-Domar model in the next sections. In his 1956
contribution, Solow discusses the behaviour of interest rate and wages and he adds a term of
neutral technical progress A in the production function such as :
Y = A(t)F (K,L)
The results are similar : the growth path is stable, depending on the rate of growth of the po-
pulation. In 1957, Solow went further with an empirical work based on U.S. Data from 1909
to 1949. Around the same time, Solow and Samuelson were working on linear programming for
economics, allowing the analysis of eﬃcient accumulation paths. In 1958, they released a book,
in association with Robert Dorfman from Harvard University on that subject. Tools and theory
were developed side by side and it tourned out to be a success for the MIT-style.
This speciﬁc identity of the MIT-economists, that I attempted to describe, can be grasped
and deﬁned  maybe more easily  through the interactions that the MIT-community had with
other intellectual community.
In the US, MIT's principal enemy was probably the Chicago monetarists, who considered
Solow and Samuelson as neo-Keynesians : after all, the MIT-economists never denied Keynes
legacy and his ideas of ﬂawed markets. But during the period that we are looking at, MIT's real
nemesis were the Keynesian economists from the old continent. Their theoretical cousins were
more than sceptical with the way growth was tackled by the neo-Classics.
2 Cambridge, UK : protectors of the Keynesian heritage ?
2.1 A very brief intellectual history and its protagonist
Cambridge : An ancient community
Cambridge is known to be the university were the ﬁrst three-year course was taught since
1903. This achievement is the logic consequence of the rise of the teaching of economic principles
during the 19th century. Alfred Marshall (18421924) was Professor of Political Economy at the
University of Cambridge from 1885 to 1908 and founded the Cambridge School of Economics.
He intended to make economics an independent subject from other social sciences. Marshall
taught a whole generation of English economists that would be moulded by his methodology.
John Maynard Keynes studied under his guidance and Keynes' work is heavily inﬂuenced by
this Marshallian heritage, which will be carried on by Keynes's contemporaries and successors
such as J. Robinson, Kaldor, Kahn, Meade, etc. Cambrigde (with the LSE and Oxford) was at
the centre of the development of economics in the ﬁrst part of theXXth century.
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Post Keynesianism : origins
The English Cambridge was made up of various school of thoughts. One of those distin-
guished itself from the other in the 1950's and the 1960's : the Post-Keynesians. Their origins
can be traced back to the publication of Keynes's 1936 General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money (GT from now on). Basically, they did not agree with the further interpretation of
Keynes's GT made by the author of the neoclassical synthesis realised with the IS-LM model by
J. Hicks, R. Meade, and others. The Post-Keynesians, that could be found in Cambridge (UK)
and in the USA saw this synthesis as a treason against Keynes's true message. As a matter of
fact the early Post-Keynesian representatives  Nicholas Kaldor, Joan Robinson, Richard Kahn
and Pierro Sraﬀa (all in UK)  directed their ﬁrst criticisms towards the Solow growth model.
They could not accept a model in which full employment is ensured thanks to perfect factor
substitution and an aggregate production function, which happens to behave exactly as expected
by the model and its author. This approach of long-run economics did not correspond to what
Keynes might have wanted to express. That is how the 'Cambridge Capital Controversies' began
in the early 1950's and continued in the 1960's, ending with the apparent analytical victory of
the Post-Keynesians. The Post-Keynesians tried to deal with questions that Keynes did not
himself explore such as income distribution or economic growth. To do so they put the concept
of eﬀective demand at the heart of their analysis, even at the long-period. As J.E. King deﬁnes
the main features of Post-Keynesianism, in his article from the Palgrave Dictionary, as such :
For Post Keynesians, demand constraints upon output and employment are not restricted to
short period and are not the result of market imperfections or wage and price rigidities, but must
be explained instead in terms of the characteristics of money and the pervasive inﬂuence of fun-
damental uncertainty.
That explains their rejection of IS-LM : with uncertainty and animal spirits, you can't
have a stable IS curve, nor a working LM function with endogenous money. Beyond that, Post-
keynesians aﬃrmed themselves through methodological and theoretical speciﬁc positions in com-
parison with the mainstream economics, that MIT-style partly represented.
An alternative to the 'neoclassical orthodoxy' of MIT
In many ways, Post-Keynesians looked like the MIT-economists. They both aimed at expan-
ding and exploring the leads left Keynes, the diﬀerence lying in the fact that the Post-keynesians
just did not accept the methodological and theoretical presuppositions that the MIT- style im-
posed. As a matter of fact, they were  like Solow and Samuelson  in favour of government
intervention, but not for the same reasons.
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They rejected the Phillips Curve model  linking level of wage inﬂation and unemploy-
ment : they believed in a more socio-political analysis of the problem of unemployment in which
distribution conﬂicts were central. In the same way, they emphasized the role of savings propen-
sities in their macroeconomic model, instead of resorting to the marginal productivity theory of
income distribution, which they dismissed through the Capital Controversies.
The Post-Keynesians shared Keynes's distrust toward too much formalized economics. J.
Robinson is known for her methodological heterodox position : she was highly sceptical of the
relevance of the use of equilibrium models. There were there no room for history in those logical
time based models.
Like the Solow model, the Post-Keynesian growth models ﬁnd their roots in the Harrod-
Domar model but their approach is radically diﬀerent but not in a single way. As a matter of
fact, Kaldor himself was criticised : his basic assumptions were not really Keynesian any more,
for he abandoned the demand eﬀective hypothesis in some of his growth models .
2.2 Post Keynesian growth models
As I explained in the previous section, demand is central for the Post-Keynesians. That
is why they developed a certain number of demand-driven growth model. Those models fea-
tured the principle of eﬀective demand and did not impose full employment of resources. As
Robinson (1956) pointed out, it is only during a mythical golden age that the conditions of
full-employment of factors and growth path stability can be met. Several economists faced the
challenge of trying to extend Keynes's logic to the long term, while respecting the main features
of the GT : Robinson, Kaldor, Pasinetti, Michal Kalecki, Edward Nell, among others. I shall
explore some examples of growth models developed in Cambridge UK during the 1950's and the
early 1960's, that can be seen like a response to the Solow model and the success that it gained
throughout the world. Those models singularised themselves from the Solow model by using
concepts other than the theory of marginal distribution, such as those of savings propensities
and investment functions.
Kaldor (1956) : growth and distribution
Kaldor presented his model in a 1957 paper. Just as Solow, Kaldor is heavily concerned with
the Harrod-Domar instability problems and exposes his own solution, that goes through the use
of a distribution model. Here are few details about the model :
Y = W + P (8)
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the national revenue is divided between wages and proﬁts
S = Sw + Sp (9)
total savings are made of savings from workers and savings from capitalists
Sw = swW (10)
with sw : worker propensity to save
Sp = spP (11)
withsp : capitalists propensity to save
Those behavioural equations respect Keynes's 1936 assumption. From the basic savings/investment
identity we obtain :
I = S (12)
I = swW + spP = sw(Y − P ) + spP = (sp − sw)P + s− wY (13)
P
Y
= [1/(sp − sw)] I
Y
− sw
(sp − sw) (14)
Proﬁts are positive when the workers' savings propensity are low, when compared the ca-
pitalists' savings propensity : sp > sw. And we can deduce from the fact that if IY = sp then
P
Y = 1 and
W
Y = 0 (and conversely if
I
Y = sw, then
P
Y = 0 and
W
Y = 1, so we have :
sw <
I
P < sp
Let's resort to variables deﬁned by Harrod in his model :
 gn =
Y˙
Y
is the natural growth rate of the model
 v =
K˙
Y˙
=
K
Y
is the marginal coeﬃcient of capital (which is a constant).
Using the fact that gnv = IY , we can rewrite equation (2.7) :
P
Y
=
(gnv˘sw)
(sp − sw) (15)
P
K
= (
1
sp
− sw) I
K
− sw
(sp − sw)v (16)
gn =
[(sp − sw)PY + sw]
v
(17)
AsPY has to be between 0 and 1, we deduce from 0 < (gnv˘sw)/(sp − sw) < 1, that the rate
of growth is stable and allows full-employment, as deﬁned by the Harrod-Domar model, when :
sp
v
> gn >
sw
v
(18)
Kaldor reﬁnes gn's interval, using concepts of minimum wage and minimum proﬁt. The share
of proﬁts depends on the values of both savings propensities and the maximum and minimum
value of PY . Kaldor obtains the following equilibrium condition :
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[a(sp − sw) + sw]
v
≥ gn ≥ [vrmin(sp − sw) + sw]
v
(19)
with a = 1−Wmin
Y
and r : rate of proﬁt
Kaldor model seems stable as long as sp > sw and proﬁt margins depends on the diﬀerence
between demand and supply.
If I > S, the system will come back to I = S
A quick overview on Robinson (1962) and Pasinetti (1962)
Joan Robinson concentrated her eﬀorts on the relationship between accumulation and proﬁt.
She based her accumulation model on the fact that the relations between the variables have to
be speciﬁed and so the motives of the human behaviours. Joan Robinson is thorough in the
description of the basic premisses of her model (technical conditions, investment, etc) which are
largely commented in the literature (Charles, 2006), and I will focus on the savings conditions.
Robinson chooses to adopt a hard kaldorian saving function with sw = 0 (the workers consume
all their revenue) so S = spP. She deﬁnes the rate of macroeconomic accumulation as such :
g = f [(P/K)a] = f(ra) (20)
with f ′ > 0 et f ′′ > 0.
The rate depends on the anticipated rate of proﬁt. She places the ﬁrms' desire to accumulate
capital at the centre of her model. There is a double relationship between the accumulation
rate and the proﬁt rate. As a matter of fact, the eﬀective rate of capital accumulation gives the
amount of proﬁts :
r =
P
K
=
I
K
1
sp
=
g
sp
(21)
with sp = 1
That allows us to draw the following curves :
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We see that there are two equilibrium : one is stable, the other is not.
Robinson's model is quite interesting because it highlights situations of potential disequi-
librium in which savings and expectations have leading roles. But I shall come back on that
aspect of the model in a few sections.
Luigi Pasinetti proposes an improved Kaldorian model, that takes into account the fact
that workers gain also proﬁts from their savings  a thing that Kaldor forgot in his model. That
modiﬁes the proﬁt and saving equations :
P = Pw + Pc (22)
and the previous equation Sw = swW becomes :
Sw = sw(W + Pw) (23)
Sc = scPc (24)
then we have :
I = K˙ = sw(W + Pw) + scPc = S (25)
I shall restrict myself to the most important assumptions and results of the model, details
being provided in the adequate literature. Just like Kaldor, distribution of revenue is socially
based : it is the distribution of revenue between workers and capitalists rather than between
proﬁts and wages that is observed. In the long term, Pasinetti assumes that the capital stock of
each class grows proportionally to their respective savings : both classes have the same wealth
growth rate (if not, one of the classes would disappear in the end).
Pasinetti manages to show that his model is stable. The main observation that can be drawn
out this model is probably the fact that Pasinetti ends up with a rate of macroeconomic proﬁt
15
doesn't depend at all on the saving propensity of the working class. The rate of proﬁt is deﬁned
as following :
P
Y
1
sc
I
Y
=
gnv
sc
(26)
The higher the level of investment is, the higher the rate of proﬁt. If the capitalists' propensity
to save decreases then the proﬁt rate increases. It is kind of a way to come back to Keynes's
GT analysis : investment is what makes the economy work. Just like Malthus emphasised,
consumption from non-working class has an important role in maintaining the stability of the
system.
In some ways, the reﬂections led by Pasinetti can be linked to those of Michal Kalecki in
1942 and in his later models which focused, amongst other issues, on the connection between
wages, consumption and aggregate demand.
3 Two intertwined interpretative communities : seeing and trying
to solve growth models weaknesses
In the following part of my paper, I will try to depict the relationship between those two
intellectual communities. As a matter of fact, it is through the confrontation of ideas from both
ends that the growth debate evolved. And despite their ontological disagreements, the members
of the two communities held fruitful correspondences and exchanges.
3.1 A complicated relationship
Keynesians from both sides of the ocean had quite a complicated relationship. They were
like cousins that were raised in diﬀerent ways, yet having a common ancestor. In the US, Solow
and Samuelson were considered Keynesians  above all by their monetarist 'enemies'  but for
their British cousins they had betrayed Keynes in spirit : there methods and theories were not
in phase with Keynes's original message anymore.
A tradition of visiting and corresponding
Paul Samuelson spent some time in Oxford in 1949. It was kind of tradition for MIT to
send some of their students to England. Cambridge UK welcomed Solow in 1962 but also Fisher
and Stiglitz and some graduate students in 1965 (Diamond went there in 1967). Frank Hahn
visited the MIT in 1956-57. Amartya Sen and Joan Robinson were there in 1961. There is a
signiﬁcant amount of correspondences between the members of the two communities. Those
correspondences show their concern for the questions of the moment during the 1950's and the
1960's : technical progress, aggregation of capital inputs in production functions, the shape of
production functions, the possibility of production technique reswitching, etc, were the subject
of a raging war (Cherrier, 2011) between Hahn, Robinson, Kaldor (who did not all agree with
one another) on one side and Solow and Samuelson on the other. The complicated aspects of
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those relationships can be seen in the following quotation of a letter of Solow to Sen :
I'm afraid I got a little annoyed in Cambridge last year by the indiscriminate use of Key-
nesian as an adjective meaning mine and neoclassical to mean yours. To the extent that
neoclassical describes the belief that a capitalistic economy tends automatically to full employ-
ment, I am not neoclassical and neither is James Meade. To the extent that neoclassical means
a belief that you need a plausible microeconomics that allows for some kind of near optimizing
behavior under whatever market conditions prevail, then it is not in the slightest incompatible
with being Keynesian ( 10/26/64, Box 60 folder S7).
Some renegades
The division in camps was not as simple as a UK vs. US partition. There were in MIT,
some economists who would be more inclined to agree with the hard British Post-Keynesians.
Robert Eisner (1958) was one of those American economists who, like the British Keynesians,
did not agree with Solow, James Tobin and the neo-classical interpretations of Harrod and Do-
mar (Hagemann, 2009). In the same way, in the UK, Meade (1963) and then Meade and Hahn
(1965) were highly critical at the Pasinetti model :they tried to show that this Post-Keynesian
model was only a speciﬁc case of the traditional neoclassical framework. Yet Hahn was not as
satisﬁed as we could think with the Solow model : he would be the ﬁrst to point out its limits
(1960, 1964). Those cases symbolises the diﬃculty to isolate each community under a unique
identity.
3.2 Diﬀerent cultures of understanding
Interpretative communities
So we have two intellectual communities with obviously the similar theoretical roots, the
same preoccupations and an utter respect for each other. Yet, they do not seem to be able to
agree on many things. Beyond the spatial separation, they appear to have evolved  since the
Second World War  as though they do not speak the same language. Their methods, their way
of expressing themselves and the concepts they think as central to understanding economic issues
are merely diﬀerent. If we use the concept of interpretative community developed by Stanley
Fish (1980), that might explain why the two communities were unable to accept each other's
interpretation of the growth economics issues.
Last time I ended by suggesting that the fact of agreement, rather than being a proof of the
stability of objects, is a testimony to the power of an interpretive community to constitute the
objects upon which its members (also and simultaneously constituted) can then agree. This ac-
count of agreement has the additional advantage of providing what the objectivist argument cannot
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supply, a coherent account of disagreement. To someone who believes in determinate meaning,
disagreement can only be a theological error. The truth lies plainly in view, available to anyone
who has the eyes to see ; but some readers choose not to see it and perversely substitute their own
meanings for the meanings that texts obviously bear. [. . . ] In the view that I have been urging,
however, disagreements cannot be resolved by reference to the facts, because the facts emerge only
in the context of some point of view. It follows, then, that disagreements must occur between those
who hold (or are held by) diﬀerent points of view, and what is at stake in a disagreement is the
right to specify what the facts can hereafter be said to be. Disagreements are not settled by the
facts, but are the means by which the facts are settled. Of course, no such settling is ﬁnal, and
in the (almost certain) event that the dispute is opened again, the category of the facts "as they
really are" will be reconstituted in still another shape. (Is There a Text in This Class, p.338 
339, 1980)
Just as Solow could not accept an interpretation in terms of distribution, Robinson com-
pletely rejected the marginalist approach of the MIT. When we have in mind Fish's perspective
on those rather gregarious behaviours, the diﬀerent interpretations of the Harrod-Domar model
that resulted are now understandable. But as I emphasised in the previous section, the relation-
ship between those two communities is much more complicated than a simple opposition. Some
of their members placed themselves in some kind of in-between position  such as Amartya Sen
and Frank Hahn (but I will concentrate on their case in the following section), trying to link
the two conceptual frameworks, probably as a way to ﬁnd new leads to overcome the theoretical
obstacles that each community has ended up meeting.
Harrod-Domar : truly a so important misunderstood ?
When one tries to take a good look the history of growth economics, there is one point
in this story that appears to be the focal point of all that followed. One cannot talk about the
Solow model without mentioning the Harrod-Domar model (I could not dodge the ball either).
What is actually funny is that it is not the Harrod-Domar growth model itself that changed
everything, but rather the interpretation  or for some the misinterpretation  that was made of
it. First common mistake that has been made was probably to almost completely assimilate
Domar's model to Harrod's. As Hagemann (2009) shows us, even if the two models are similar
in some aspects  for many that mistake is mostly due to similar notations  they do not really
ﬁll the same purposes. Harrod's model distinguishes itself from Domar's through the use of an
investment function of the multiplier type. Hagemann (2009) perfectly summarises both models :
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With s : constant average and marginal propensity to save
S = sY
vcap : capital-output ratio in growth equilibrium (full-capacity utilization and full employment).
Ycap : full-capacity output,
Y D : aggregate demand, and the
operator xˆ: growth rate of a variable x.
It = vw(Dt˘Yt−1)
where Dt : expected demand for overall output
Y t− 1 : actual output in the last period
vw (acceleration coeﬃcient) : desired capital-output ratio
For Harrod (1939), his model is the marriage of the `acceleration principle' and the `multiplier'
theory. And there will be : Yt = 1sIt
Even if similar, the two economists did not have the same ambition while creating their model,
Harrod having a clear interest in the question of cycles, much more than Domar. But basically,
the models have the same conclusion  that probably participated to the process of assimilation
of one to the other : growth is inherently unstable in this model. Three types of growth rate
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are deﬁned by Harrod : the natural growth rate, the warranted growth rate and the actual
growth rate. The warranted  warranted by the state of the system  rate of growth has every
chance to be diﬀerent from the natural growth  long-run equilibrium growth rate  and any tiny
deviation from the equilibrium growth leads the system to a spiral of inﬂation or unemployment.
In the 1950's, growth seemed quite stable : there had to be a way to make the natural rate of
growth and the warranted rate of growth correspond. And that is exactly what Solow and
Kaldor tried to do : they solved the problem in their own way, according to their respective
community of understanding. Once again, let's use another nice diagram from Hagemann (2009) :
As we can see here, Kaldor took interest in the saving propensities (s) aspect of the problem
and Solow took care of v  the capital-output ratio of the system : they both oriented their
analysis according to their community of understanding.
Even today, the interpretation of Harrod's works is problematic. Did he really try to ex-
tend to the long run the Keynesian framework ? For a lot of historians of economic thought,
the answer is yes. But for some, Solow simply went completely wrong going along this path
of interpretation. Not because his interpretation is wrong, but because the questions that he
presents in his 1956 contribution are simply not the good questions (Halsmayer and Hoover,
2009). His famous knife-edge problem just does not exist. The main purpose of Harrod's was
not even the long run growth equilibrium : after all, he doesn't tackle the subject of natural rate
of growth until quite late in his contribution. His main attention is on the question of dynamics
and the importance of the diﬀerence between the warranted rate of growth and the actual 
expectations dependant - rate of growth  which is itself not easily deﬁned up to now. And as
we can see in the wonderful Hagemann's diagram, the actual rate of growth is not included in
the attempt to cope with the secular instability problem. Does that mean that Solow  and
by extension Kaldor and all both communities went completely wrong ? No, I would support
that those contributions were their way to express their mutual interest for long and short run
analysis, and that according to the way of each community. Those intellectual works are part of
a greater intellectual process. As a matter of fact, those weaknesses would soon be identiﬁed by
both the communities and would be addressed in the following years. I shall expose that aspect
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of the history of the growth models in a few sections.
4 Some tentative to link our two communities together : synthesis
and the road to medium-run equilibrium
As I supported a few sections below, I think those debates, mistakes, interpretation and
misinterpretation of the issue of growth were part of a bigger intellectual process. That process,
which not a conscious one nor a constant one and is the result of the interactions of diﬀerent
minds, appears to have at its centre the purpose to unite short run and long run analysis of
growth.
4.1 Identifying the weaknesses : the status of expectations and investment
in growth
Hahn and Matthews (1964), later Sen (1970), pointed out that Solow's success is linked to
the fact that he dismissed a part of Harrod's analysis of growth : Solow doesn't take into account
the instability problem related to the potential divergences between warranted rate of growth
and actual rate of growth. By doing so, Solow did not place his model in the same framework
as Harrod's and excluded all possible analysis of cyclical ﬂuctuations. Those divergences, which
Harrod related to expectations, were at the centre of Harrod's attempt to have a model which
explained economic growth and cycles at the same time. In 1966, Solow tried to clear his posi-
tion, acknowledging that he did ignore a part the instability problem but still maintaining that
disequilibrium was a matter of keynesian short-run analysis :
It is clear to me that I oversimpliﬁed matters in 1956. The model was new and I didn't un-
derstand all its implications. Some of what Harrod called instability is, of course, a matter of the
behavior of eﬀective demand, oﬀ equilibrium paths. Harrod never speciﬁed very clearly what he
had in mind, and indeed there is very little in the literature even now that marries the theory of
growth and eﬀective demand. What I was getting at in 1956 was this : the special character of
Harrod's model rests in the fact that the natural and warranted rates of growth are independent
numbers... That characteristic of the model rests on ﬁxed proportions. (It is immaterial whether
Harrod believed that factor proportions are technically ﬁxed or simply never change.) In turn, at
least some aspects of instability arise because the economy is always being pulled away from the
warranted path because it diﬀers from the natural path.
Solow's 1956 model main purpose was indeed to trace full-employment  not actual  paths
towards the natural steady state. Solow received the support of Evsey Domar, who acknowledged
the 1956 model just before joining Solow at MIT, where he became his colleague. Yet it is not
like the question of expectations had never been discussed. In a 1952 article, Hahn addresses the
issue of expectations and conditions of equilibrium. He tries to deﬁne the type of expectations
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that would assure a dynamic equilibrium. In his 1953-54 contribution on price levels and interest
rates, Solow himself tackles the issue in the conclusion of his article :
From another angle, the equations do not reﬂect the fact that one could aﬀect output by ope-
rating on prices. This would appear naturally in an attempt to build up a causal dynamics. A
mechanical ﬁrst step in this direction could be made by letting the choice between consumption
and investment depend on the interest rate and price level in some arbitrary but simple way. I
do not carry this out here, although the formal execution would be fairly easy, because I am not
convinced that this obvious line of approach is necessarily the best one. Another possibility would
be to think of investors as Ramsey-type utility maximisers over time. A certain amount of depth
could be added by assuming the existence of two goods diﬀerentiated with respect to their utility
in consumption and in investment. But this goes beyond the simple Harrod model and past the
bounds of simple arithmetic.
Solow mentions what appears to be an independent investment function but did not go
further in his reﬂections for the reason he evokes. We could here a sign of the weight of the
weight of the community surrounding the process of models developing.
Let us also recall the Robinson model that I presented earlier : it was an anticipations
based model that illustrated situations of equilibrium and disequilibrium, using the mechanism
of entrepreneurs' anticipations. That aspect did not really have any inﬂuence in the following
Post-Keynesian work on growth. Robinson's contribution was in fact eclipsed by Pasinetti break
trough. The Post Keynesian community did not acknowledge Robinson's work : that also testi-
ﬁes of the importance of the community of understanding in the process that leads a concept
on the top priority list of the researchers.
That being said, does that mean that nothing were done about the question of expecta-
tion and investment ? Of course not. Those issues kept coming back in the debates, in various
way : the possibility to think a growth model that featured both long and short characteristics,
equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium outcomes started to work its way through the discussions.
4.2 Frank Hahn and Amartya Sen : slowly constructing the premisses of a
synthesis
4.2.1 Amartya Sen : above the battle
In 1962, Amartya Sen presented 'The Money rate in the pure theory of growth' at the In-
ternational Economic Association Round-Table Conference on the Theory of Interest Rate, held
at Royaumont, in France (Sen, 1970). There underlined the diﬃculty to deﬁne an autonomous
investment function for a growth model that would reﬂect the empiric phenomenon. He also
pointed out the lack of relevance of the assumption of perfect foresight : that would reﬂect in
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his following contribution.
A fun comparison between Neo-Classical and Neo-Keynesian models
So, in 1963, Amartya Sen published an article where he proposes to discuss the diﬀerent
aspects of the 'neo-classical' (NC) and 'neo-keynesian' (NK) models of distribution. That article
is interesting at several level. First, it testiﬁes of the quite complex relationships between the
two communities. Sen spent some time at the MIT in 1962. Obviously, he has been quite puzz-
led by the debates between the two communities. Maybe those are more alike than they think
themselves or at least their share as much defaults ? Second, Sen chooses to analyse the diﬀerent
distribution model : that reﬂects the importance of the concept of distribution in the growth
debates. Third, in this article, Sen touches upon the subject of anticipations  a subject that will
be higly relevant in the following discussions. At last, that article has been heavily commented
by Paul Samuelson in a letter he sent to Sen in September 1963 (Solow, box 68, Duke University
archives).
The model
To be able to compare the two distribution models, Sen uses a simpliﬁed model from which
he makes the features vary to correspond to one or the other model.
Here are the main assumptions of Sen's simpliﬁed model :
- only one good X, that can be consumed or use in production ;
- the production function displays constant return to scale ;
- there is no problem of capital depletion : each year a ﬁxed proportion of the capital goods is
discarded so the value of the capital goods are independent from their age ;
- in the short-term, capital and labour supplies are given and they are the only production
factors. Investment at year n, doesn't yield anything until year n+1 : the capital stock supply is
given through what has been left from the previous year. For simplicity, Sen chooses an inelastic
labour supply ;
- saving behaviours depend on the source of the revenue : if a worker gains a part of his revenu
from the property of something, then he will behave towards this part of his revenue just like a
capitalists towards his proﬁts.
Notations :
X : net ﬂow of produced goods
X¯ : stock of goods used in the production
L : quantity of labour used in the production
w : wage rate in terms of X
pi : proﬁts in terms of X
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sp : propensity to save out of proﬁts
sw : propensity to save out of wage
I : investment in terms of X
X = X(L, X¯) (27)
with a production function homogeneous of degree one
w =
∂X
∂L
(28)
X = pi + wL (29)
I = sppi + swwL (30)
I = I∗ (31)
with I* being the investment level corresponding to a given behaviour (Keynesian animal spi-
rits) and to the level of growth expected by the entrepreneurs.
Using the following notations, Sen presents us the main features of the model.
Sen points out that this system can't satisfy all its equations and the full employment condi-
tions L=L* and K=K*. Indeed, there are ﬁve equations but only four unknowns X,w,pi and I. It is
only by accident that a solution can be found in this case. To resolve the system, you must aban-
don one equation or add an unknown. That is what NK and NC theories do in their speciﬁc way.
Sen ﬁnds his way back to the NC system by dropping the equation (31). Investment is
not arbitrarly given and it is equalised with savings, through an out-of-the system mechanism :
the interest rate. We then have I = S. That mechanism is not discussed by Solow nor by Swan :
none of them used an independent investment function. In James Meade's analysis, that me-
chanism is not automatic : there is a central monetary authority that will assure the equality
between S and I.
Sen then drops the equation (28), resolves the system to ﬁnd the NK results :
pi
X
=
I∗
X(sp − sw) −
sw
(sp − sw) (32)
with sp ≥ I∗X ≥ sw
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sw.sp : share of the savings in the total income. The central point gives us the income dis-
tribution between labour and capital.
Sen goes through the same process by dropping equation (30) : he ﬁnds the Johansen model
developed by Lief Johansen in A multi-sector Study of Economic Growth (Amsterdam, 1960),
where the I/S equality is maintained thanks to taxations and allocations. Finally, Sen adds
unemployment as a new unknown to be in a General Theory-like model.
What happens if...
As Sen underlines it, dropping (28) or (31), or (30), is in fact quite an extreme assumption.
So proposes to look for the conditions for which NC and NK models can be recovered without
ignoring the previous assumptions. To do so his presents three models with speciﬁc assumptions.
Model I :
- full-employment ;
- the Investment is ﬁxed in real terms ;
- the actual price can diﬀer from the anticipated price, such as over-determination of the model
is avoided ;
- the level of price p is unknown ;
- q : level of price anticipated by the employers
- m : money wage rate, determined according to q through a process of competition that leads
to full-employment.
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The equations of the model are :
X(L∗, X¯∗) (33)
m =
∂X
∂L∗
q (34)
R = Xp− L∗m (35)
R : monetary proﬁts p : determined by investment/savings process such as S = I.
Ip = spR+ swL
∗.m (36)
I = I∗ (37)
Sen add a given anticipated level of price :
q¯ = q (38)
So there are 6 equations and 6 unknowns : X,m, p, q,R, I.
Sen shows us quite easily that the NK model of distribution results can be recovered :
R
pX
=
I∗
X(sp − sw) −
sw
(sp − sw) (39)
In the same way it appears that the NC results only hold if p = q, yet we obtain the following
condition :
I∗ = sp[X − ∂X
∂L∗
L∗] + sw(
sX
∂L∗
)L∗ (40)
(40) is independent of the expected level of price. So if this result is true for one expected
level of price, it is true all the other level. As Sen put it : The assumption of 'perfect foresight'
cannot be made consistent with the system by varying the level of expected price. It should also
be noted that the required condition for NC result to hold as given by equation (40) is that the
independently determined amount of investment (I∗) must equal what the total planned saving
would be if the NC distribution model held. This can take place only accidentally, and but for
that NC result is invalid. (40) is very important. If it does not hold, Sen notices that it would
be quite easy to build a model with continuous inﬂation, thanks to the use of hicksian elasticity
of substitution. But he does not beyond that remark.
So we have a model where the expected price determined the monetary wage rate which
determines the level of price :
q → m→ p
It is through the variable m that the system adjust itself. But what would happen if we had a
variable m that had an inﬂuence on q¯, such as m→ q¯ ?
q andm are both in equations (34) and (38) : they have to be consistent the one with the other. If
by accident : q = βm then (38) and the entire system do not hold any more and full-employment
is no more attainable.
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Sen points out another thing : from the basic assumptions  which are crucial to the model  the
changes in price levels do not aﬀect at all the savings propensities and that seems to be quite
a bad empiric hypothesis. In the NK results, the feedback of the changes in the expectations of
price are not taken into account : there are no discussions about the actions that could result
from those changes. That implies that even if the managers try to maximise their proﬁt (in
perfect competition), they will not necessarily attain the Pareto optimum :
m
p
=
∂X
∂L∗
(41)
which won't be equivalent to (34)
Model II : Basically, it is the same model as the ﬁrst but with a level of investment ﬁxed in
monetary terms :
I.p = V ∗ (42)
The resolution of the system gives us the following equation :
R
p.X
=
(V ∗ −X.q¯αsw)
(V ∗ +Xqα(sp − sw)) (43)
with α = ∂X∂L∗
X
L∗ which the elasticity of production with respect to the level of labour at
full-employment.
As Sen makes us realise : this result doesn't correspond to NC results nor to NK results. Le NK
conclusion that says that the higher the rate of accumulation, the higher the share of proﬁts
is, remains true but the distribution deﬁned here is not the one of the NK model. Besides, the
result is not independent from the seize of marginal product of labour at full-employment.
The NC result is valid only if p = q, substituting in the other equations, Sen gets the following
necessary condition :
V ∗
q
= sp(X˘
sX
∂L∗
.L∗) + sw.
∂X
∂L∗
.L∗ (44)
Unlike in the model I, this condition is not independent from price expectations : On the
contrary, for any given level of investment (in money terms), there is one level of expected prices
that makes the assumption of perfect foresight consistent with the rest of the system, resulting in
the validity of the NC result. But Sen qualiﬁes this positive statement because : Of course the
condition p=q still makes the model over-determined, and can only be satisﬁed if accidentally the
right price were expected, compared with the size of money investment equal to the size of what
the saving would be if the NC model held.
Model III : Here, Sen presents a General Theoryish model which is supposed to depict the
model of the GT : the assumption of full-employment is dropped and L becomes an additional
unknown and there is always perfect foresight.
L ≤ L∗ (45)
Sen distinguishes three possible cases from model III :
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1. L¯ < L∗
2. L¯ = L∗
3. L¯ > L∗
where L¯ is the equilibrium level of employment.
He then compares those possibilities with the models he presented. Possibility 1 : this case
corresponds to a stable unemployment equilibrium. The Keynesian unemployment model can
hold but not the NC model nor the NK model. Possibility 2 : NC and NK models van hold but
also Model III. It will be a case of perfect foresight for Models I and II (p=q). Possibility 3 :
Model III does not hold. I or II are the only options. If I is chosen, the NK result will hold but
not the NC result. If it is II that is chosen, none of the results will hold, except if by accident
the unique level of price expectations which allows the NC result to hold is held.
Conclusion
Sen concludes his article with a very lucid point of view. The discussion that he held was
aimed mainly at reducing obscurity rather than assessing validity and the only conclusion he
can really draw out of his work is that both NC and NK use very restrictive assumptions to
make their textitspecial results. Those distribution models are both limited and use simplifying
assumptions. That is an important point because those models are the basis of a wider class of
economic theories such as economic growth. Sen ends his article the following sentence, which
perfectly symbolises his in-between position in the Cambridge/Cambridge debates : In raising
questions about these distributional models, we intend to question the entire bodies of economic
thinking that share, explicitly or implicitly, the assumptions of those models.
Samuelson look on that article
The 11th september 1963, Paul Samuelson sent a letter to Amartya Sen where he largely
comments on Sen's article. That letter gives us a little insight of the intellectual relationship
between two economists who held diﬀerent positions. Also, it oﬀers us the opportunity to have
a look at the reaction of Samuelson towards an article that highly criticises his theoretical posi-
tions and at the way he considered the British Keynesians. It is quite in a warm and friendly
tone that Samuelson addresses himself to Sen. He re-writes the model proposed by Sen in his
article in a slightly diﬀerent form. That allows him to give his opinion on Sen's approach. He
does not really seem to agree with the formal separation that Sen made between Neo-Classical
and Neo-Keynesian economists :
You lump Kaldor and Robinson together as Neo-Keynesians. They do have some aﬃnities :
both are non-neoclassical (but in diﬀerent degrees, J.R being less strong in her position). But if
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I were Joan Robinson or Richard Kahn, I would sue you for slander in calling the Kaldor-Full-
employment doctrine Neo-Keynesian.
Samuelson points out the little mistakes than Sen did in the presentation of his model : the
model misses some features to be a real full-employment distributional model. He proposes some
elements to complete Sen's model. He then emphasises the fact that Kaldorian assumptions on
savings behaviours are based on quite light empirical facts. And he concludes his letter with this
quite funny paragraph, which reﬂects the tense relationship between the two intellectual com-
munities : Mind you, I have said nothing favourable to a Ramsay-Solow-Tobin Full-Employment
Neoclassical model, which I might call [Model] I' without specifying it. If that model, I', is unrea-
listic  and I could supply some evidence on that  that as such casts no credibility on [Model]
III'. Rather it makes II more interesting. Kaldorian III, which is emasculated Kaldorian, re-
mains of minor econometric interest (albeit sp = 1 and sw = 0 has little relevance for USA
1960, whatever it may have for the land of Kaleckians).
Let us notice the reference to the Kaleckians : obviously, Samuelson does not hold a burning
passion for them either and it would be quite fascinating to understand why, but it is not the
purpose of this paper.
4.2.2 Frank Hahn and disequilibrium economics
In 1960, Frank Hahn published an article in which his main focus is the stability of equi-
librium - the existence of that equilibrium is admitted from the start. In the framework used,
prices adjust themselves to market errors but none of those adjustments happens instantaneously.
Hahn chooses a Cobb-Douglas production function.
He presents two types of models : a model A, that he calls Wicksellian, and a model B. Let
us have a look to the main features of each model.
Model A : Wicksellian
At all time, the following equation is veriﬁed :
w
p
=
∂Y e
∂L
(46)
where w : wage rate, p : price, Y e : equilibrium level of production, L : labour
If the equilibrium is perturbed, the following chain of events takes place :
- the prices of the goods increase if there is an excess demand or decrease if there is an excess
supply ;
- the distribution of income remains unaﬀected ;
- the expectations on the future change rate in terms of price increase ;
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- that leads, with the monetary interest rate considered as given, to a substitution between K
and L ;
- that substitution have itself an impact on the excess of demand of goods.
So Hahn asks himself : what process will lead back the system to equilibrium? In fact,
it depends, for any hypothesis of formation of expectations, on a comparison between rate at
which the factor substitution changes the marginal product of capital and the rate at which the
real capital income changes.
Model B
In this model, Hahn chooses to abandon the assumption of perfect wage adjustment. The
real wages can go beyond the equilibrium value at any time with decreasing prices. That means
that the factor substitution happens not only because of diﬀerence between the real capital
income and the marginal product of capital but also, because of diﬀerences between the real
wage rate and the marginal product of labour. When the prices fall, the distribution of income
moves in favour of the workers. And that  if we take into account the Kaldorian assumptions
 is supposed to raise the propensity to consume.
So with a raise of w such as w>we, we shall have :
- at every level of the production process, a factor substitution ;
- Y<Y e
- the change in the income distribution might increase the consumption demand but it could
also reduce the investment demand : ↓ Y → Y < Y e → K
L
↑→ I ↓
Main conclusions
Hahn conducts a thorough investigation of each model, giving us a description of the be-
haviour of each system when out-of-equilibrium. He concludes that the model A would have a
stable full employment equilibrium with constant prices if (a) interest rate are constant but expec-
tations are suﬃciently inelastic or (b) if the demand for investment is relatively unresponsive to
changes in the real interest rate or (c) if interest rate are moderately ﬂexible. For Hahn, model B
allows us to have a closer look at the role of factor substitution in the stability of the equilibrium :
Factor substitution is important to stability because it greatly increases the responsiveness of
the system to the price mechanism. If there were no possibility of factor substitution, the chances
of interest rate or wage changes stabilizing the system would be much more slender since produ-
cers would have to contend with the deadweight of excess capital. But when that has been granted,
it remains true that the speed with which producers react to "errors" remains of the greatest im-
portance to stability and since this "reaction speed" depends amongst other things on the degree
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of conﬁdence in the continuance of equilibrium, some rather old-fashioned propositions in busi-
ness cycle theory regain some of their respectability.
Expectations and investment are at the centre of his argument : he is deﬁnitely on the path
of a certain synthesis between long and short run growth equilibrium.
Hahn and Solow
In 1959, Robert Solow and Frank Hahn held a correspondence just before Hahn released
his 1960 paper in the Quaterly Journal of Economics. The remarks made by Solow gives us
an insight of his position towards the question of expectations and investment. It testiﬁes that
Solow had those issues in mind, even if those were absent of his current work (Assous, 2013).
Of course you're right and Nicky's [Kaldor's] model simply will not stand up under scrutiny.
When it is not self-contradictory it is more or less completely arbitrary. As you realize, however,
there is one respect in which it is a step in the right direction. The Harrod- Domar legacy of
paying attention only to equilibrium paths is by now an obstacle. All these ad hoc stability state-
ments about what happens oﬀ such a path are useless without an explicit causal dynamics. But
if we had the latter, then the equilibrium paths would appear as certain special-motion and one
could deal with them directly. (Solow to Hahn, March 23, 1959)
4.2.3 Finally : An unsatisﬁed Robert Solow
An old concerned
So Solow, even if often considered as the champion of equilibrium model with his 1956
contribution, also had in mind the out-of-equilibrium type problems. An interesting hypothesis
would be to think that Solow was actually in quest for that medium run growth equilibrium
(Assous, 2013) and that his work reﬂects that quest.
As I mentionned earlier in this paper, Robert Solow distinguishes himself by being an econo-
mic theorist and an applied economist. His main concern is to be able to design model that would
match empirical data. But in the beginning of the 1960's, he has obviously conscience that his
1956 model  despite its elegance - does not match those requirements and he is puzzled about it :
In the shortest run, given capital means given concrete items and of course you have no objec-
tion to that. In the shortest run capital is like land, unalterable, ﬁxed, etc. In a longer run, some
of the concrete items are not ﬁxed. But something is ﬁxed : asset preferences, savings habits,
relation among these things and the rate of proﬁts, time preferences, the amount of accumula-
tion already done, whatever, so in a longer run, given these things, and given the technological
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input-output relations, the production function relating possible lists of physical inputs to pos-
sible lists of physical output, I deduce which among the possible forms of capital goods will be
constructed in equilibrium. Now to get from one equilibrium to another, when a disturbance (like
a change in the production function) occurs, I don't know. But how to compare equilibrium, and
to ﬁnd something which can be common - described as substitution between labor and capital, I
do know. (Solow to Nicholas Kaldor, January 30, 1961)
In his 1964, Solow is the president of the Econometric Society  succeeding Malinvaud.
In his presidential speech, he expresses himself as such :
Its importance goes far beyond the desirability of being able to predict how output perman hour
will change from quarter to the next. Art Okun or Ed Kuh or Dan Suits can already do that.
What I am looking for is a way to unify the economics we teach our students and the econo-
mics we use when we advise governments and analyze passing economic events, and do it in
a way amenable to econometric treatment. This patching up of theory to explain experimental
uniformities is the way science usually proceeds. (Solow 1964 : 29-30, skipping inserted page 29a)
The outcome of those reﬂections are to be seen in the 1968 article, he co-writed with Joseph
Stiglitz.
Solow and Stiglitz (1968)
Just as Sen's paper did in 1963, this paper is an attempt to clarify the relation between two
alternative theories of distribution : marginal productivity theory and Post-Keynesian theory.
Even if the model used is clearly a short-term type one, that article can be seen as a step toward
medium-run growth model. As a matter of fact, they studied their model in terms of trajecto-
ries, investigating the impact of disturbances on stable or on unstable equilibrium. That article
looks like a compilation of the questions and critics that were emphasized in the previous year.
Stiglitz and Solow try to deal with those in a systematic way, taking into account even Kaldorian
assumptions. In their concluding remarks, the authors underline the importance of the quest for
a synthesis between long and short run macroeconomics, giving new leads for the future :
[...] the model needs to be extended to the long run. The ﬁrst requirement is to ﬁnd a repre-
sentation of the shift in short-run production possibilities brought about by current investment.
The easi-est course is to suppose that the short-run production function is simply a section of a
long-run production function in capital and labor. If this is too great a stretch of the imagination,
there are more plausible  but less manoeuvrable  alternatives ; see, for example, Solow, Tobin,
Weizsacker, and Yaari and Attiyeh. Depending on how this task is accomplished, there may or
may not arise the further question of the choice of labor-intensity for current investment. When
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a choice of technique is available, the current and prospectivep rice conﬁguration will have an
inﬂuence on the labor-intensity selected for any given increase in capacity. Moreover, since the
price conﬁguration has a lot to do with the proﬁtability of any given investment, it will have
an inﬂuence on the amount of capacity installed. In the long-run context, investment cannot be
treated as exogenous, even as an approximation.
Conclusion
In this paper, I tried to give an accurate view of two speciﬁc intellectual communities which
worked on growth economics during the 1956 − 1968 period. The main teaching that I drew
out this work is the diﬃculty to clearly identify those groups. Inside and outside those com-
munities, there were intricate relationships that inﬂuenced the process that lead to the idea of
medium-run macroeconomics and made the economic science evolve. As a matter of fact, the
opposition between the MIT researchers and those from Cambridge UK  often restricted to the
Controversies on the Capital  covered a more profound ﬁeld of inquiries. Our protagonists knew
the limits of their models and tried to dig up some solutions through the analytical linking of
their respective theory and vision of the world. I support that the exchanges that were held bet-
ween the members of each communities of understanding testiﬁes that they were aware of their
limits and that were waiting for a better solution to ﬁll the weaknesses of the growth theory :
a working medium-run growth model. But as Solow expressed himself in his Nobel Prize speech :
Growth theory was invented to provide a systematic way to talk about and to compare equi-
librium paths for the economy. In that task, it succeeded reasonably well. In doing so, however, it
failed to come to grips adequately with an equally important and interesting problem : the right
way to deal with deviations from equilibrium growth. (Solow 1988 : 311)
Macroeconomic theory has not yet successfully taken up that challenge oﬀered by growth
theory but, undoubtedly, some future economists will take interest in the matter.
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